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1. Introduction
At the dawn of the 20th century, Burma was the richest state in Southeast Asia, glim-
mering with prosperity and the expectation of greater things. By the dawn of the 21st
century Myanmar was the poorest state in Southeast Asia (Turnell, 2009). Its grand
buildings were in decay, its borders were shut and its people were among the poorest
of any in the world. As Turnell (2009) comments “[Myanmar’s history] is a history of
repression and release, and repression again. It is a history of economic construction,
reconstruction and decay. It is a history of plans, and of chaos. It is a history of hope,
and hopes dashed”.
The elements that underpin Myanmar’s history of torrid economic development are
not widely understood. This paper offers a rare glimpse into Kalaymyo, a city with
a population of approximately 200,000 people in the west Sagaing region of Myanmar,
shedding light on the areas stagnant economic growth and the most important constraints
to business growth. The research uses an original dataset of 677 households (including 492
firm owners) living in Kalaymyo in 2011. The survey was designed to provide information
on the household, business and living conditions of individuals in Kalaymyo. The survey
is broadly consistent with the World Bank Rural Investment Climate Surveys, so that
firm constraints are comparable with global findings.
The relationship between poverty alleviation and business development is well estab-
lished. As such, Kelly et al. (2008), argue that there are many feasible approaches to
poverty reduction that are made possible through commerce; and further, that there are
profits in developing markets that have been previously overlooked which are of great
consequence to efforts of poverty alleviation. Accordingly, business conditions are impor-
tant for poverty alleviation. Of particular interest then, are constraints to the growth
of business. Efforts to understand the constraints to enterprize growth in developing
countries are not new; this area was addressed as early as 1962 by Stanley and Morse,
where they comment “By and large [enterprizes of the poor] do not prosper. When they
do prosper, it is not for long. [These] small industrial firms have never grown beyond
a certain point, as if there were a physical barrier between the small and medium sized
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range impossible to cross”.
This physical barrier between small enterprizes and medium enterprizes has been a focal
point of recent literature. Several papers use inter-regional datasets to evaluate differences
that emerge across the world (Batra et al., 2004; Ayyagari et al., 2008). Specifically, these
papers evaluate a range of firm level constraints including national policy instability,
financial constraints, regulation, inflation, exchange rate fluctuations and corruption. In
each of these papers, the authors conclude that finance, corruption and property rights
are important factors for firm growth in the developing world.
Another set of papers evaluate firm level constraints at a national level. Fisman and
Svensson (2007) show that in Uganda corruption is an important constraint to firm
growth, with a one percentage point increase in the rate of bribery resulting in a three
percentage points decline in firm growth. Using data from China, Bangladesh and India,
Dollar et al. (2005) find that the availability of financial services has a strong positive
effect on growth rates of assets, employment, and output. They also show that this
effect varies within countries, indicating the importance of local governance. Bigsten
and Soderbom (2006) conclude that investment in Africa is low because firms have been
unable to identify investment opportunities. Credit constraints were therefore found to
be an important, but not the most important constraint. Rajan and Zingales (1998)
focus on the role of the financial sector, showing that countries with a more developed
financial sector are better able to support the growth of firms.
The analysis of firm constraints in this study follows Dinh et al. (2010); Hausmann
et al. (2008) in which a “second best” approach is used to understand the most binding
constraint on firm growth. This approach differs from previous efforts at understanding
firm constraints in that it acknowledges that the list of constraints on enterprize growth
in developing countries is a long one; and further that, due to scarce resources, it is
impractical to address each of these constraints simultaneously. This approach therefore
attempts to reveal the most “binding” constraint, which is defined as the constraint which
has the largest effect on enterprize growth where “second-best” effects are likely to be
minimal.
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The results show that credit access, electricity provision and the intensity of market
competition were the most serious constraints. Of these, access to informal finance was
found to be the most binding constraint limiting business growth. Firms that identified
informal finance as a major constraint to business growth earned, on average, 7.5% less
than other firms between 2008 and 2010. Restricted access to markets and formal lines
of finance were also significant constraints for enterprize income growth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the survey and data.
Section 3 characterizes the firms and their owners. Section 4 analyzes the determinants
of income, borrowing and investment. Section 5 evaluates the constraints to enterprize
growth, establishing which ones are binding and section 6 concludes.
2. The Survey and the Data
This study involved the collection of primary data from Kalaymyo, a small urban center
in the west Sagaing region of Myanmar. Kalaymyo is an urban regional hub surrounded
by intensive agriculture and is home to approximately 200,000 people . The area is in the
Sagaing Region, but also close to Chin State. Sagaing is the largest state/region/division
in Myanmar, while Chin State is one of the smallest. While the study area is in the
Sagaing Region, in many respects it associates more closely with the Chin State, in
that the majority of its people are Chin. According to the UNDP poverty profile, Chin
State is the poorest area in Myanmar with 73% of the population and 46% of the urban
population falling below the poverty line. In contrast, Sagaing Region as a whole tends
to perform substantially better. Of all people living in the Sagaing Region, 27% of them
fall below the poverty line, dropping to 22% for urban areas. The study area therefore
lies between two areas with dissimilar poverty headcounts.
The design of the survey is based on the rural investment climate survey, as devel-
oped by the World Bank. Information was collected on household characteristics, firm
characteristics, investment climate, supply and demand of finance, poverty, well-being
of individuals and the obstacles for firm start-ups. The area of study is divided into 42
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villages among which seven were randomly selected and the surveyors provided estimates
of the total number of households in each. The surveyors were then asked to record
all addresses in the chosen village. A random sample was then derived for each village,
with an additional 20 households per village randomly selected in case of non-response.
In addition to the random sample, we targeted clients of a microfinance institution in
the area, and interviewed 132 of 180 client households. The microfinance sample largely
shares the same demographic characteristics as the representative random sample. The
final sample consists of 677 households with a total of 2744 individuals. In all interviews,
the head of the household responded to the questions. Among all head of households
interviewed, 35% were female. The small number of villages in our survey limits our
analysis for infrastructure related constraints. The lack of supply of electricity and roads
affect all households even though some may not need the infrastructure for their business.
We find that despite a high proportion of firms citing electricity and telephone access as
a problem, our econometric analysis does not find these as binding constraints because
there is no enough variation across households. However, most of our constraints show
enough variation across households and are not limited by this issue. Our choice of vil-
lages was limited to a degree, by a lack of resources and institutional constraints. The
survey was conducted near the Chin Hills which, at the time of the study, had certain
access restrictions.
3. Households and Firm Characteristics
3.1. Household Characteristics
Head of households interviewed for the study are aged between 18 and 84 with 93% in the
working age of 20 to 65. Males were overrepresented in the initial random sample (74%)
but the addition of the microfinance clients, which targets primarily female entrepreneurs,
decreased the proportion to 65% in the final sample. Literacy rates are very high in the
region with 97% of the head of households able to read and write. The educational
attainment is also high with 63% of interviewees obtaining a secondary education or
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higher. The average family size was 5.3 and most children had some education. The
overall poverty rate is 18.3% based on a poverty threshold determined by the UNDP
in 2004. The level of firm ownership is very high in the region. For instance, 67% of
households in the random sample were classified as business owners. The rate increased
to 73% with the inclusion of microfinance clients which can get a loan only if they owned or
are starting up a business. This level of enterprize ownership is higher than corresponding
rates in other developing countries . When disaggregating enterprize ownership by poverty
status, we find that the poor are equally likely to own firms as the non-poor. The firm
ownerships rates were 66% for the poor versus 67% for the non-poor.
3.2. Firms Characteristics
One question in the survey asked respondents to identify who owns the firm in the family.
Figure 1 shows that 67% of firms are a jointly owned by all family members, 20% are
owned by only the husband and 12% owned by the wife only. This ownership structure
makes it hard to determine the gender and educational level of the enterprize owner. In
our econometric analysis, we will assume that the gender and educational attainment of
the enterprize owner are those of the household head. There is a mixture of new and
old firms with a larger share of older firms. We defined three categories: up to 5 years
old are categorized as young firms, mature firms are between 5 and 10 years and the
rest are categorised as older firms. We find that 28% are young, 23% are mature and
48% are older than 10 years. Decomposing firms by sector (Table 1) shows that business
in Kalaymyo is dominated by service firms (45%) followed by agriculture (34%) and
manufacturing (21%). The lack of enterprize diversity, as discussed at length by Banerjee
and Duflo (2011), is made clear in this sectoral composition. Within the services sector,
for instance, street vendors and general stores account for 64% of total services activity
(equal to almost one quarter of all businesses). Within the agricultural sector, the same
lack of diversity occurs, with 62% of firms producing staple crops.
Unlike the agriculture and services sectors, the manufacturing sector is somewhat more
diversified. Individuals involved in tailoring account for 24% of all manufacturing followed
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by carpentry (21.0%), building or brick layering (15.2%) and furniture manufacturing
(11.4%). However, this diversity of enterprize is a minority in the overall economy with
manufacturing accounting for just 21% of all business activity.
Another key characteristic of firms in Kalaymyo is that most operate in the informal
sector. Overall, only 37% are registered with government. Registration rates are highest
in agriculture (46%), services (35%) and then manufacturing (27%). This registration
pattern follows from the location of operation. In fact, most businesses are operated out
of the owner’s home (53.5%) or have no fixed location (26.2%). Manufacturing firms are
more likely to be operated from the owner’s home (e.g. brick layers) and service firms
are more likely to have no fixed location (e.g. street vendors or transport businesses).
The high level of informality will affect firms access to financing, business training, and
profitability.
Survey respondents were asked to estimate the income they got from their firms in the
years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. The answers to this question have to be interpreted with
care, as firms don’t have accounts to look at and the question required respondents to
recall information from 3 years ago. It is easy to see that the numbers are rough estimates
as most are multiples of 100,000 kyat. Nevertheless, these estimates can be used to assess
the determinants of income and analyze various constraints to firm success. Moreover,
income is not a very good measure of enterprize success. However, the nature of the firms
made it hard to measure profits as the vast majority are small informal firms with no
accounts. It was not appropriate to measure firm success by the number of employees
either, as most firms did not have any employees.
The average income for all enterprizes in 2010 for the sampled population was 1,422,240
kyat (USD$1,778 ), while the median income was just 900,000. Figure 2 shows how
enterprize incomes are skewed to the left, with 75% of enterprize incomes falling below
1,400,000 kyat. In other words, just a handful of businesses are earning high incomes,
while the incomes for the majority are very small. This is consistent with the ‘missing
middle’ concept observed in numerous developing countries and regions, whereby small
and medium firms fail to develop into large firms (Dinh et al., 2010; Krueger, 2007). This
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inevitably results in restricted and exclusive growth patterns and consequentially, high
poverty levels.
Looking at incomes by sector (table 1) reveals that firms in manufacturing earn on
average twice as much as those in agriculture and almost 50% more than firms in services.
This explains the low overall average income since most firms operate in agriculture and
service sectors.
As mentioned above, incomes seem stagnant. After controlling for high rates of inflation
experienced in Myanmar in 2008 and 2009 (23% and 11% respectively), the survey data
revealed an average contraction of 6.3% in real income for all firms between 2008 and
2010 (see figure 3). This finding remains robust after controlling for enterprize longevity,
where no evidence is found to suggest that long lived firms are growing faster or have
higher incomes.
Another observation is that these low earning firms are not employing many people.
Approximately nine in every ten enterprizes employed no one. For the few enterprizes that
did have employees, 80% of them had either one or two employees. Just a small fraction
of firms in manufacturing had more than two employees. The enterprizes analyzed are
not just low earning, and hiring few people, but they are also growing very slowly or even
contracting.
One explanation for stagnant enterprize incomes can be found in firm investment levels.
Over the last three years, just 25% of all businesses had invested in some form of fixed
capital. Those enterprizes that did invest in the last three years earned, on average, 87%
more in 2010 than those enterprizes that did not. The difference in means is significant at
the 1% level. Fixed capital investments were predominantly in land (approximately 30%
of all fixed investments), equipment or machinery (30%) or buildings (27%). Businesses
that invested did not just have a higher income - they also grew faster between 2008 and
2010. Enterprizes that invested grew by 73 percentage points more than those that did
not invest. This suggests that the returns to investment are positive and substantial.
Intuitively, individuals would not take out a loan unless their return was higher than
the interest rate (after accounting for risk and profit). An average real interest rate of
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42% , further supports the conclusion that returns to investment are both positive and
substantial (see Table 2). High interest rates in response to high marginal returns is
typical in developing countries , while marginal returns on investment in excess of 42%
per year is consistent with rates found in other developing countries (other studies have
estimated marginal returns at between 68%-250% ).
To explain this phenomenon, an indication of both the desire and ability to invest in
enterprize is needed. Figure 4 provides a crude estimate of this, showing the proportion of
individuals with firms who accessed credit over the last three years (17% of the sample),
those who did not need credit (41%) and those who did want credit but could not access
it (42%). This clearly shows that overall access to credit in Kalaymyo is very low . For
those who could not access credit, constraints in the supply of loanable funds are likely to
be important. It is remarkable that, in the context of high returns to investment, 41% of
all firms indicated that they did not have any need for a loan. This may be due to their
aversion to risk and the history of financial crises in the country, which many believe has
eroded trust in the financial sector. For instance, 87% of people who did not want to
access credit cited a reluctance to get into debt as the main reason for not actively seeking
a loan. There is evidence of this trust deficit in the data where a statistical difference
was found between State bank interest rates and the interest rates for all other providers
(see table 2). Interest rates on State bank loans are, on average, 20% p.a. (or 1.69 per
month) lower than all other loan providers. However, despite having lower interest rates,
State bank loans account for just 7% of total loans. This indicates either that people
choose not to take State bank loans because the perceived costs of borrowing from the
State are much higher or that the States supply of loanable funds is limited. The second
of these two reasons is in line with anecdotal evidence from business owners that State
banks are less interested in the loanable funds market and more involved in currency
exchange markets. The characteristics of firms that borrow and invest will be analyzed
in the next section.
Another key issue in the business environment for firms in Kalaymyo is access to physi-
cal infrastructure, which has an important role in promoting investment and encouraging
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enterprize growth . According to Stern (1991), “the deficiencies of infrastructure are
likely to account for a substantial part of low productivity in developing countries.” This
is because it is very hard to run factories when electricity is unreliable, telephone connec-
tions are poor, and transport links between centers of production and consumption are
hazardous or non-existent.
In Kalaymyo, just 20% of all firms have access to electricity. As we will see in the
next section, the quality, cost and access to electricity is identified as a major constraint
to business growth. Access to telecommunications, however, is significantly worse. Just
2.4% of all business owners have access to a telephone. This is likely to have important
consequences for business growth in terms of synchronizing value chains and ensuring effi-
cient delivery between enterprize and end users (i.e. just in time production). Waverman
et al. (2005) evaluates the benefits of a good telecommunications system by describing
the emergence of a “growth dividend” arising from a reduction in interaction costs, si-
multaneously expanding market boundaries and increasing information flows. In stark
contrast to this, the availability of water is very high, with 99% of business owners re-
porting access. This results from an advantageous geographic location and also a very
shallow water table in parts.
4. Determinants of firm income, borrowing and
investment
In this section we want to identify the firm and owner characteristics that are linked to
high income and those that are important to determine which firms borrow and invest.
4.1. Determinants of firm income
For the determinants of income, we run OLS regressions of the logarithm of incomes from
2008 to 2010 on various characteristics. The definition of the variables and summary
statistics are presented in table 3. Most of the variables were discussed in the previous
section.
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Table 4 shows that firms with owners that attained higher levels of education earned
slightly a higher income in 2010 but not significantly in the other two years. Firms
managed by males earn more income; the coefficient is large and significant at the 1%
level. Young firms, those less than 5 years old, earn lower income with a high and
significant coefficient. The coefficients on mature firms, while positive, are not significant
for all years. Regarding sectoral differences, we find that service firms earn a higher
income compared to agriculture and the coefficient of manufacturing is not significantly
different from zero in all three years. As we saw in table 1, manufacturing firms have
the highest income, followed by services and then agriculture. However, our sample has
fewer manufacturing firms, which explains the fact that the coefficient on manufacturing
is not significant. Another finding is that formal firms earn higher incomes in all three
years. This finding is consistent with the evidence that informal firms are less profitable
and less productive . We also find that firms with employees, either measured as dummy
variable or using the logarithm of 1 plus the number of employees, have marginally higher
income.
In the previous section, external finance and investment decisions were discussed at
length. The coefficient for investment is large and significant in all three years. In 2010,
firms that invested in the three years earned 24% more than firms that did not invest.
However, the causality between investment and income can run in both directions. Firms
that invest can earn high returns and higher incomes but also firms are more likely to be
able to invest if they have higher incomes in the first place. The second direction is very
likely given that firms are highly credit constrained. To deal with this endogeneity issue,
we could have looked at the regression of lag investment and income or use instrumental
variables. Unfortunately investment times are not known and suitable instruments were
not available. Instead, regressions were run for both directions and as is discussed below,
the evidence points to investment causing income.
In the last column of table 4, we include an interaction term between borrowing and
investing and found it to be significant at the 1% level. This highlights the importance
of financial access for the success of firms in Kalaymyo. We also included two dummy
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variables for firms that have access to electricity and a telephone. We find that access to
telephone is associated with higher income but there no significant association between
access to electricity and income. In this case also the causality may run in both directions.
4.2. Determinants of financial access and investment
As previously noted, excluding the clients of the microfinance institution from the sample
shows that only 17% of firms obtained a loan during the period 2008-2010. Here, we focus
on the characteristics of firms and owners that determine the likelihood of borrowing and
investing. The same characteristics discussed in the previous section are used. Probit
models are estimated and we report the marginal effects in table 5. Three specifications
that differ by the year of income are presented.
The results show that only income and formalization are significant predictors for
obtaining a loan. A 1% increase in log of income leads to between a 9 and 10 percentage
point increase in the probability of obtaining a loan. This means that lenders lend to
the more successful firms and the poorest are excluded from the credit market. Also
formal firms are about 10% more likely to obtain a loan than informal firms. This finding
confirms that one of the channels of formalization is increased participation in the credit
market. As we have seen in the previous section and well see next, borrowing increase
the likelihood of investment, which in turns increases income.
For investment, we also included incomes for 2008-2010. The results in table 5 show
that high income in 2008 and 2009 don’t increase significantly the likelihood of investing,
but income in 2010 increases the probability by 17.6 percentage points. The coefficient is
significant at the 10% level. This effect is very small compared to the effect of obtaining
a loan. The coefficient on loan is highly significant at the 1% level in all years and
obtaining a loan increases the likelihood of investment by 76 to 78 percentage points.
These findings show that high incomes do not lead to more investment but the ability of
borrowing is the more important factor. The level of education is also a big determinant
of the decision to invest. The level of education increases the likelihood of investing by
30 percentage points. Moreover, firms in the service sector are more likely to invest in
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all three years, while young firms invest less. This is consistent with the previous finding
that young firms earn lower incomes and are not more likely to borrow. Formality does
not increase the likelihood of investing, which means its effect is through the ability to
borrow.
5. Constraints to Enterprize Growth
This section discusses the business environment and identifies which constraints are the
most limiting for enterprize growth. Survey participants were asked questions about
various constraints they may face in the operation of their business.
5.1. The relevance of constraints
The survey’s business constraint questions were asked in a two stage process. First, par-
ticipants were asked if various issues were “relevant” to their business. To illustrate this,
consider a storekeeper selling clothes at the local market. For this business, agricultural
price controls are clearly not a relevant issue. Second, where an issue was identified as
relevant, business owners were asked to grade the corresponding constraint from zero (not
a constraint) to three (a major constraint).
For each constraint then, a measure of relevance is presented for the whole sample,
indicating the proportion of businesses for which the issue is applicable. A second set
of figures is then presented, indicating the severity of the issue in constraining business
growth. It is therefore possible for a constraint to not be widely relevant (where few
businesses identify it as applicable), and still return a high proportion (of those businesses
for which it was applicable) identifying it as a major constraint to business growth. As
this study is looking to understand constraints to the business community as a whole,
however, it does not focus on issues identified as relevant by only a small proportion of
respondents. A constraint is considered important for business growth if it satisfies two
criteria; it must both be relevant for a large proportion of businesses in the sample and
have a high proportion of those businesses grading it as a serious constraint.
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Figure 5 shows the nine most relevant issues for businesses. Generally, three categories
of issue were identified as particularly relevant for businesses, namely financing, elec-
tricity and markets (including high competition and weak demand). Issues relating to
telecommunications, roads, tax systems, government, land use policy, licenses & permits,
labor markets, and agricultural policy were identified as relevant to a smaller proportion
of respondents.
5.2. Severity of constraints
The grading results, shown in Table 6, for each constraint provide a revealing snapshot
of the difficulties of operating a business in Kalaymyo. The results serve to confirm just
how challenging a region this is for businesses. There are significant constraints in the
area of physical infrastructure, government policies and market competition. However,
these issues pale in comparison to the severity of constraints created by a dysfunctional
financial system.
There are a range of financing issues which are cited as serious constraints in the re-
gion. Perhaps the most striking is the lack of access to own and family capital, with 78%
of all respondents identifying this as a major problem for business growth - the highest
proportion for any constraint in the survey. It is interesting that access to formal lines
of finance is deemed not relevant by 78% of all respondents. Drawing on the experiences
of local microfinance projects in the area, this should be interpreted as a general lack
of profile of the formal banking sector in the community. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that there is a tendency to rely on family and community for capital well before inves-
tigating opportunities offered by private and state banks. There is likely a number of
reasons for this, including a volatile history of the formal banking sector over the last 50
years. Given the general reliance of business on informal sources of financing then, these
findings suggest an inability to fund investments generally. This constraint is central to
understanding the broader business environment of Kalaymyo.
Another important enabler of economic growth and business development is physical
infrastructure. Businesses require roads to transport goods between locations; electricity
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to maintain productive capacities and to take advantage of technological improvements;
and telecommunication infrastructure to maintain supply chains and reduce transaction
costs. Each of these categories of infrastructure is a significant challenge for businesses
in Kalaymyo.
Electricity issues were identified by many as a serious constraint to enterprize growth,
with electricity provision having three subcategories, namely cost, access and quality.
The cost of electricity was both the most relevant issue and had the highest proportion
of respondents stating that it was a major problem for business growth. Lack of access
to electricity was also considered a major constraint as was power surges and blackouts.
Importantly, electricity access is not differentiated by poverty status (that is, both the
poor and non poor lacked access to electricity), meaning that electricity access is likely
limited to a majority of people for supply reasons rather than demand. It is not surprising
that only 20% of all businesses in the area have access to electricity.
As with electricity, telecommunications infrastructure comprised three sub categories,
namely cost, access and quality. Access to telephone services is the most serious constraint
to enterprize growth (in this category) with approximately 18% of business owners stating
that it is a serious constraint, while approximately one in ten businesses identified tele-
phone costs and telephone quality as a serious constraint. Poor roading infrastructure was
generally less of a constraint than both telecommunication and electricity infrastructure
with 11% of all respondents stating that it was a serious constraint.
The results for infrastructure as a constraint to business growth need to be looked at
in the context of the current business environment. The current business environment is
a reflection of current infrastructure provision. Businesses are, by design, accustomed to
operating with poor electricity access, little telecommunications and poor roads provision.
As this is largely the same environment for all firms, it is likely that business owners do
not understand the full implications of infrastructure provision on economic development
and business growth. As a result, these figures are likely to reflect a very conservative
assessment of infrastructure constraints on business growth.
Market conditions were also frequently cited as major constraint to business growth,
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with the most significant of these being the existence of too many sellers or tough com-
petition. Approximately 40% of all respondents identified this as a major constraint to
enterprize growth. This is unsurprising given that the majority of firms are small retailers
selling non-differentiated goods. For instance, approximately 37% of businesses are either
street vendors or staple crop producers (see Table 1).
Government policies and regulations can have a strong influence on the ability of busi-
nesses to grow. Participants were asked about both tax systems and land use regulations
(including agricultural policies). With respect to the former, high tax rates was shown
to be an important business constraint. Approximately 73% of those that identified tax
as a relevant issue stated that it was a major concern. Interestingly though, 72% of
participants did not identify high taxes as a relevant constraint, which may imply that
only a small proportion of businesses actually pay tax. This is consistent with the finding
that only 37% of firms are registered with the government. This may have important
implications for tax efficiency, equity and the overall ability of the government to collect
taxes and fund public infrastructure.
Land use and agricultural policies generally scored very low in terms of their relevance
for business owners. As a result, these issues do not come across strongly as constraints
to enterprize growth. Land ownership uncertainty is the only exception to this, where
approximately 21% of respondents identified land ownership uncertainties as a relevant
issue, with 75% of these businesses identifying it as a major constraint (equating to 16%
of all respondents). These results need to be considered in the context of the survey
overall where just 34% of all businesses operated in the agricultural sector. The results
may differ markedly for more rural areas in the wider region.
It is somewhat surprising that corruption was not identified as much of a constraint
to business growth. Only 9% of respondents identified corruption as a major constraint,
while 91% of businesses state that it was not a relevant issue at all. Anecdotal evidence
from people in Kalaymyo suggests that corruption is a serious and pervasive issue, tran-
scending all parts of life, and it is interesting that this has not come through more strongly
in the data. Corruption is generally difficult to measure however, and it is more likely
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that the survey did not capture its full effect, rather than corruption being unimportant
to business growth. It is also possible that business owners view corruption as a conduit
for business growth, rather than being a constraint.
Using the pre established criteria for determining an important constraint (relevant
for a high proportion of businesses and a high proportion of businesses identifying it as
a major constraint to business growth), constraints relating to credit access, electricity
provision, and the intensity of market competition appear to be the most serious for en-
terprize growth. As will be discussed, this is not uncommon for developing countries. The
next section uses regression analysis to determine the most binding of these constraints.
5.3. Binding constraints to enterprize income growth and investment
Up to this point, constraints have been analyzed according to their severity and there has
been no discussion as to which constraint is the most binding and which would have the
largest effect on business growth should it be removed. Figure 6 is the starting point for
this analysis, showing those constraints that are most often reported as serious by enter-
prize owners. Issues involving financing are regarded as the most serious constraints (for
the highest proportion of businesses); while issues involving key infrastructure (particu-
larly electricity services), competition and tax rates are also often cited. These constraints
are broadly consistent with those found by the World Bank across developing countries .
Using the work of Hausmann et al. (2008) (hereafter HRV), analysis is undertaken to
understand which of these constraints are binding. HRV takes a practical approach to
answer this question, using the theory of “second best” (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
According to this theory, when there are multiple constraints, addressing one constraint
may not lead to a pareto improvement. Where this is the case, it is more appropriate
to address the most binding constraint, defined as the one with the largest effect, where
“second best” effects are likely to be minimal (Dinh et al., 2010) (hereafter DMN).
This section follows the work of DMN , applying their methodology to the data. For
this analysis, we are looking to derive the binding constraint with respect to enterprize
income growth between 2008 and 2010 and the decision to undertake capital investment
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as analyzed in section 4.2. Enterprize income growth between 2008 and 2010 is calculated
in the following way:
EIGit = (lnEIit lnEIit− 2)/2
Where EIGit is enterprize income growth for firm i in year t. Nineteen constraints have
been selected based on their relevance to businesses (as identified in the previous section).
Summary statistics for each of these constraints are shown in table 6. Participants were
asked to grade each of these constraints on a scale of zero to three;where three indicates
a serious constraint and zero corresponds to no constraint.
Three models, adapted from DMN, were developed using enterprize income growth
between 2008 and 2010 as the dependent variable. The models are defined below:
EIG = b0 + b1Individual Obstacle + b2Firm and Owner Characteristics + e1 (1)
EIG = b0+b1All 19 Obstacles+b2Firm and Owner and Owner Characteristics+e2 (2)
EIG = b0+ b1Only Significant Obstacles + b2Firm and Owner Characteristics+ e3 (3)
Model one includes firm characteristics with each constraint analyzed separately. Model
two then uses all 19 obstacles in the regression along with the firm and owner characteris-
tics. Finally, model three takes only the important constraints from models one and two
and uses them alongside the firm and owner characteristics. To be considered important,
a constraint must satisfy three tests. The obstacle must reach significance, it must have
the expected sign (i.e it must be negative) and the effect must be large. For investment,
the left hand side is replaced by the dummy invest and the equations are estimated by
probit.
Firm and owner characteristics are included because the data evaluating obstacles to
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enterprize income growth is subjective. For instance, it is possible that more successful
firms are less likely to view the business environment as restrictive. This possibility is
controlled for by including owner and firm characteristics as in the previous section.
The results for income growth of each model are shown in table 8 . A consistent finding
across each of the models is that the financial constraints (both formal and informal access
to capital) and market access are significant constraints to enterprize income growth. For
instance, firms that identified informal finance as a minor problem experienced, on aver-
age, 2.5% lower enterprize income growth between 2008 and 2010 than those businesses
for which this was not a problem. For those firms that identified informal finance as a
major constraint, enterprize income growth was on average, 7.5% lower (2.5 multiplied
by three). Firms identifying access to formal finance as a serious constraint grew, on
average, 5.7%. Firms identifying market access as a serious constraint grew, on average,
6.9% less between 2008 and 2010 than those businesses for which this was not a problem.
Credit constraints and issues of finance have been identified as critical and binding con-
straints in many places throughout the developing world (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Love
and Mylenko, 2003). The findings presented here suggest that Kalaymyo is no different.
These findings are also broadly consistent with the findings of DMN, which identified
access to finance as one of the most binding constraints.
Infrastructure (electricity, telephone and roads) constraints were not identified as ro-
bustly binding in all of the models. In model 1, access to electricity was found to be
negative and significant, but it was not in the other two models. Moreover, electricity
cost, telephone cost, roads are significant in model 1, but with a positive sign. This
means that firms complaining about these constraints are growing faster. For the cost
of electricity and telephone, we introduced an interaction term between electricity and
telephone, to control for the facts that some firms may complain about costs even though
they don’t have electricity or phone. With this change, telephone cost changes sign and
loses significance but cost of electricity remains positive and significant in models 1 and
2.
This finding on the infrastructure constraints may be because telephone, electricity
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and roads infrastructures are exogenous constraints for firms in Kalaymyo. For instance,
just 2.4% of firms have access to telephone services, indicating such services are supply
constrained. In the same way, poor road quality and the lack of a reliable electricity
network are constraints faced by all businesses in Kalaymyo. The analytical techniques
used here are limited by a lack of variation between firms with respect to these factors.
To overcome this issue, a larger dataset would be needed, analyzing enterprize growth
over a range of cities with variation in infrastructure provision.
We also find that land ownership uncertainty is negative and significant in model 1 but
not in models 2 and 3. Corruption was significant only in the third model with the wrong
sign. As discussed before, very few firms identified corruption as a relevant issue and it
may well be that non-performing firms are trying to justify their poor performance. For
simplicity, the results for firm characteristics have not been presented here. The most
robust findings for those are that higher education, and formalization lead to faster income
growth and firms in services grow slower. Depending on the constraints considered, some
of the characteristics become significant but this may be due to multicollinearity.
In table 9, we show the results for investment. For simplicity we don’t show the results
for the insignificant variables. We have already analyzed the effects of the owners and
firm characteristics and found that the most important factor for making investment is
obtaining a loan. Beyond these characteristics, we find that informal capital, market
access, access to electricity, ownership, labor availability and corruption are all negative
and significant in model 1. Some of these lose significance in models 2 and 3. Market
access, labor availability and corruption remain significant with the correct sign. These
results highlight that beyond external financing market access constraints that affects
income growth, firms in Kalaymyo are constrained by labor availability and corruption.
It is also reasonable to think that firms in different sectors are affected by different
constraints. We find that in addition to external finance and market access, firms in
agriculture are affected by poor roads, tax payment procedures and labor availability in
some of the models. A notable finding for firms in services is that market access is no
longer significant as this constraint is not very relevant to them but ownership of land is
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highly significant in all models. This may be due to the difficulty of having access to a
place in local markets.
6. Conclusion
This study has offered a rare glimpse into the lives of people working and living in
Kalaymyo. It involved a survey developed and administered to 677 individuals (including
492 firms), capturing information on the household, business and living conditions of
respondents. As far as we are aware, such a study has never been conducted in the area
before.
The analysis has found that the area is alive with economic activity and a high degree
of entrepreneurship. However, businesses were generally characterized as having small
earning potential, low employment and slow or stagnant growth. While there was some
evidence of high marginal returns, there was a general reluctance or inability to access
credit markets to take advantage of these opportunities. A long-established lack of confi-
dence in the financial sector has likely played an important role in the diminished market
for loanable funds, leading to a severely underdeveloped financial system. The lack of
credible and trustworthy financial institutions, together with low investment in public
infrastructure, is undoubtedly constraining the growth of firms. As a result, businesses
tend to be small, stagnant and undifferentiated from one another.
An analysis of the most important constraints to business showed that problems re-
lating to credit access, electricity provision and the intensity of market competition were
the most serious. Of these, access to informal finance was found to be the most binding
constraint preventing business growth. Firms that identified informal finance as a major
constraint to business growth earned, on average, 7.5% less than others between 2008
and 2010. Restricted access to markets and formal lines of finance were also significant
constraints for enterprize income growth. Moreover, labor availability and corruption are
significant constraints to investment.
The study provides some important insights for development agencies seeking to facili-
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tate economic development in the region. It appears, for example, that the area is in need
of credible financial services, including credit facilities and savings programs. The unique
economic environment in Kalaymyo, along with Myanmar’s turbulent financial history
will mean, however, that the design and administration of such programs will need to
proceed with caution, avoiding the temptation to follow a one-size-fits-all development
agenda.
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A. Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sector composition and Income in 2010
Sector % of first digit
sector




Staple crop 62.2 1,020,147
Cash crop 29.3 920,104





Builder/Brick layer 15.2 3,392,500
Other 14.3 3,526,800
Furniture 11.4 1,699,167
Wood products 9.5 830,000
Blacksmith 4.8 1,570,000
Services 45.1 1,404,050
Street vendor - food 36.7 1,086,975
Store owner - general goods 17.2 1,477,632
Street vendor - clothes 10.0 2,340,909
Transportation - goods 9.5 1,151,429
Transportation - people 8.1 1,205,556
Other 8.1 1,725,556
Business services 7.7 1,934,118
Telecommunication 2.7 796,666
No sector 0.4 425,000
Total 100 1,422,240
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Table 2: Summary of terms for recent loans by loan provider




State bank 12 7.0 22.2
Private bank 87 50.9 42.6
Microfinance institution 3 1.8 40.3
Pawnshop 7 4.1 52.3
Extended family 0 - -
Community group 64 37.4 41.4
Average interest rate 41.5
Total 173 100.0
Table 3: Description and Summary of Statistics of Characteristics
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
income08 ln(income in 2008) 494 13.44 0.91
income09 ln(income in 2008) 494 13.56 0.86
income10 ln(income in 2008) 494 13.68 0.86
gender Gender of the owner ( 0 or 1) 494 0.88 0.32
owner ed Education level of the owner (0=no primary,
1=primary, 2= secondary, 3= higher secondary)
494 1.79 0.87
young Equal 1 if operated less than 5 years; 0 otherwise 494 0.28 0.45
mature Equal 1 if operated between 6 and 10 years; 0
otherwise
494 0.24 0.43
service Firm is in the service sector 494 0.45 0.5
manuf Equal 1 if firm in manufacturing; 0 otherwise 494 0.21 0.41
formal Firm is formally registered with the State 494 0.36 0.48
size log(1+number of employees) 492 0.12 0.36
loan Equal 1 if obtained a loan in the last 3 years; 0
otherwise
494 0.43 0.49
invest Equal 1 if invested in the last 3 years; 0 other-
wise
494 0.25 0.43
electricity Equal 1 if has access to electricity; 0 otherwise 492 0.2 0.4
telephone Equal 1 if has access to telephone; 0 otherwise 492 0.02 0.15
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Table 4: Determinants of Income
income08 income09 income10 income10
owner ed 0.057 0.058 0.082* 0.081*
(0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
gender 0.432*** 0.456*** 0.331*** 0.353***
(0.119) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112)
young -0.153* -0.169** -0.234*** -0.244***
(0.091) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
mature 0.135 0.110 0.092 0.096
(0.092) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087)
manuf 0.094 0.032 0.036 0.034
(0.105) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
service 0.401*** 0.324*** 0.189** 0.187**
(0.087) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
formal 0.285*** 0.208*** 0.298*** 0.278***
(0.080) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
size 0.590*** 0.582*** 0.503*** 0.509***
(0.109) (0.101) (0.100) (0.099)
invest 0.160* 0.216*** 0.236***
(0.088) (0.082) (0.083)
electricity 0.064 0.105 0.023 0.039
(0.098) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
telephone 0.978*** 0.777*** 0.747*** 0.728***
(0.284) (0.254) (0.246) (0.245)
loanInvest 0.345***
(0.093)
R-sqd 0.228 0.227 0.207 0.216
Adj. R-sqd 0.210 0.209 0.189 0.198
Obs. 476 483 490 490
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. OLS regressions * significant
at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the
1% level
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Table 5: Determinants of borrowing and investment







owner ed 0.078 0.031 0.035 0.303*** 0.297*** 0.291***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
gender -0.283 -0.246 -0.187 0.070 0.040 0.031
(0.284) (0.281) (0.276) (0.235) (0.236) (0.235)
young 0.293 0.270 0.283 -0.272 -0.294* -0.299*
(0.205) (0.202) (0.197) (0.174) (0.173) (0.172)
mature -0.243 -0.233 -0.213 0.128 0.115 0.110
(0.213) (0.214) (0.212) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165)
manuf 0.335 0.244 0.253 0.203 0.194 0.175
(0.222) (0.220) (0.217) (0.196) (0.195) (0.195)
service 0.175 0.121 0.162 0.365** 0.351** 0.361**
(0.196) (0.193) (0.190) (0.165) (0.165) (0.164)
formal 0.822*** 0.740*** 0.710*** 0.140 0.122 0.106
(0.178) (0.173) (0.173) (0.147) (0.145) (0.146)
size 0.086 0.155 0.180 0.241 0.181 0.174
(0.203) (0.198) (0.193) (0.189) (0.188) (0.182)
loan 0.784*** 0.776*** 0.759***
(0.146) (0.144) (0.141)
Pseudo. R-sqd 0.130 0.129 0.120 0.143 0.148 0.149
Obs. 347 354 361 476 483 490
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Probit regressions reporting marginal effects * signifi-
cant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level
26
Table 6: Summary of constraints to enterprise activity (%)




Lack of access to electricity 59.0 4.1 16.8 20.1
Power surges and black outs 63.5 4.9 13.6 18.1
Cost of electricity 56.2 11.2 6.5 26.2
Telecommunications
Lack of access to telephone service 72.4 2.2 7.1 18.3
Poor quality of telephone service 78.1 3.2 7.7 11.0
Cost of telephone service 75.9 7.7 5.3 11.2
Transportation
Lack of roads 90.3 3.7 4.3 1.8
Poor quality of roads 77.9 5.1 6.3 10.8
Little or no availability of transport for merchandise 84.4 5.1 5.1 5.5
Financing
Lack of own and family capital 10.1 2.6 9.1 78.1
Lack of access to banks and other formal institu-
tions
78.3 2.6 6.5 12.6
Lack of access to sources of informal financing 43.2 2.0 6.5 48.3
Interest rates and other transaction fees are too
high
60.9 5.7 5.3 28.2
Difficult/Demanding borrowing procedures 69.4 3.2 8.5 18.9
Value of collateral is too high 90.7 2.0 1.8 5.5
Markets
Lack of access to markets 77.7 5.1 8.9 8.3
Weak demand for goods and services 64.3 7.1 12.6 16.0
Too many sellers/ tough competition 49.5 4.3 6.7 39.6
Government
Corruption 91.5 0.8 3.4 4.3
Restrictive laws and regulations 92.3 1.2 3.0 3.4
Difficulty with legal system and conflict resolution 97.4 0.4 1.4 0.8
Licenses and permits
Time and cost of registering enterprise 87.8 2.0 5.9 4.3
Time and cost of obtaining licenses/ permits for
enterprise
87.4 3.9 3.9 4.9
Complicated procedures for registration and licens-
ing
91.3 1.6 3.9 3.2
Tax systems
High tax rates 71.8 2.0 5.5 20.7
Complicated rules and procedures 89.5 2.6 4.5 3.4
Labour availability
No skilled labour available 88.8 1.6 4.1 5.5
Land use policy
Regulation on the use of farmland 91.3 2.4 3.9 2.4
Difficulty in obtaining construction permits 94.1 1.6 1.4 2.8
Land ownership uncertainties 79.1 1.2 4.1 15.6
Agriculture policy
Import duties and export taxes on agricultural
products
88.2 1.8 4.7 5.3
Crop restrictions 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price controls for agricultural products 87.0 0.4 4.3 8.3
Other 99.4 0.2 0.3 0.1
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Table 7: Variable descriptions and summary statistics for Constraints
Variable Description Mean S.D
Owncapital Lack of own capital or family capital 2.55 1.05
Informalcapital lack of access to informal sources of capital 1.60 1.49
Competition Market competition is intense 1.36 1.47
Interest Interest rates and other transaction fees are too high 1.01 1.39
Electricitycost Cost of electricity 1.03 1.34
Tax High tax rates 0.75 1.29
Electricityaccess Lack of access to electricity 0.98 1.3
Procedures Difficult/demanding borrowing procedures 0.77 1.27
Telephoneaccess Lack of access to telephone services 0.71 1.25
ElectricityqualityPower surges and blackouts 0.86 1.3
Ownership Land ownership uncertainties 0.56 1.17
Formalfinance Lack of access to sources of formal finance 0.53 1.12
Telephonecost Cost of telephone service 0.40 1.07
Telephone
quality
Poor quality of telephone service 0.52 1.08
Road Poor quality of roads 0.50 1.07
Marketaccess Lack of access to markets 0.48 1.02
Controls Price controls for agricultural products 0.34 0.96
Corruption Difficulty with corruption 0.20 0.77
Labour No skilled labour available 0.26 0.84
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Table 8: Investment in 2010 Probit Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (11) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
owncapital -0.008 0.004
(0.011) (0.011)
informalcapital -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
formalcapital -0.028*** -0.019* -0.017*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
interest 0.005 0.017* 0.017*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
competition -0.008 0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
marketaccess -0.032*** -0.025** -0.023**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)










procedures -0.012 -0.010 -0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010)






corruption 0.018 0.026* 0.025*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
R-sqd 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.12
Adj.
R-sqd
0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
Obs. 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. OLS regressions. Some nonsignificant regressions for model 1 are not reported for space reasons. The coefficients on
owner and firm characteristics are included but not reported. * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level
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Table 9: Income Growth Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (11) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (24) (25)
owncapital 0.240*** 0.118 0.111
(0.088) (0.101) (0.098)




interest 0.274*** 0.161** 0.160**
(0.051) (0.075) (0.072)
competition 0.175*** 0.082 0.080
(0.056) (0.064) (0.064)
marketaccess -0.199*** -0.199** -0.191**
(0.075) (0.083) (0.082)






roads 0.239*** 0.083 0.090
(0.063) (0.078) (0.077)
tax 0.279*** 0.137** 0.145**
(0.054) (0.064) (0.063)
procedures 0.247*** 0.112 0.115
(0.054) (0.074) (0.073)




labour -0.335*** -0.213* -0.215*
(0.120) (0.128) (0.128)
corruption -0.246** -0.198 -0.197
(0.115) (0.139) (0.137)
Pseudo. R-sqd 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.30 0.29
Obs. 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490 490
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Probit regressions. Some nonsignificant regressions for model 1 are not reported for space reasons. The coefficients on owner and
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Figure 4: Access to credit over the last three years
32












Figure 5: Relevant business constraints












Figure 6: Most serious constraints to enterprize growth
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